Abstract

Makalah inimembahas Self-ModelTheory of Subjectivity(SMT)yang
dikembangkan oleh filsuf dan neurosaintis Jerman, Thomas Met
zinger. Secara umum, SMT menyatakan bahwa “diri” tidak perlu dipa
hami sebagai entitas metafisik yang berdiri sendiri. Apa yang kita alami
sebagai diri merupakan hasil dari proses representasi saraf yang memben
tuk model-diri fenomenal atau Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM). Karena
model ini bekerja secara transparan, subjek tidak menyadari bahwa pen
galaman tentang “aku” adalah sebuah konstruksi. Dari titik inilah ilusi
tentang diri muncul. Dengan memadukan neurofenomenologi, filsafat
pikiran analitik, dan temuan empiris mengenai pengalaman luar tubuh
serta lucid dreaming, Metzinger menawarkan kerangka naturalistik yang
radikal untukmemahamikesadaran,selfhood,dansubjektivitas. Makalah
ini menelaah arsitektur konseptual SMT, sejumlah kritik utama terhadap
nya, serta implikasinya bagi etika, filsafat agama, dan diskursus tentang
kecerdasan buatan

Keywords

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